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STATEMENT

their Complaint on November 12, 2013. The Complaint alleges aright to assess, lien and
foreclosure of Appellants' properties pursuant to Idaho Code§ 45-810. The Defendants,
Nadia Beiser and David Richards (hereafter "T.T. LLC), and Matthew Farner and Mary Beth
Giacomo (previously married, hereafter

own property in Phase II of the Pend Oreille

View Estates.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that at a July 24, 2013 Association "special meeting". the
Association authorized a one-time paving assessment of over $200,000.00. R. Vol. I, p.29. A
disproportionate share (41 %) of the paving assessment was allocated to T.T. LLC and Farner, both
of whom were not permitted to vote at the "special meeting".
The Complaint seeks $41,541.34 against T.T. LLC and $23,740.17 on each of the two (2)
Farner parcels. R. Vol. I, pp.30-31. The Defendants' properties are all within Phase II of Pend
Oreille View Estates (hereafter "POVE") and are subject to Declaration of Covenants, Conditions
and Restrictions recorded as Instrument No. 459407 (hereafter "Phase II CC&Rs") while Phase I
properties are subject to a different Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions recorded
as Instrument No. 449457(hereafter "Phase I CC&Rs"). Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Counsel in
Support ofDefendants/Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment, Exhibits "B" and "D".
.
Affirmative Defenses,
On December 31, 2013, the Defendants Farner filed their A.11s\ver,
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. R. Vol. I, pp.81-89.

against the Defendants,

Vol. I, pp.127-133. The Plaintiff sought to amend their

Complaint and Appellants stipulated to entry of an Order Amending Plaintiffs' Complaint. R.
I, pp.136-137.
Plaintiff filed

Motion for Summary Judgment together with Affidavit and

Memorandum in Support on May 19, 2014. R. Vol. I, pp.138-202.
response, the Defendants filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment challenging the
Association's authority to assess, lien or foreclose or enforce the "special assessment" for paving,
as against Appellants' properties in Phase II. R. Vol. II, pp.231-259.
response to the Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and/or in support of their initial
Summary Judgment, on June 30, 2014, Plaintiff filed Supplemental Affidavits of Greg Zirwes, their
Reply Brief, additional Affidavits of Teresa Zirwes and a Response Memorandum. R. Vol. II,
pp.260-284.
The Defendants filed Motions to Strike Portions of the Affidavits of Teresa Zirwes on July
8, 2014. R. Vol. II, pp.285-289.
On July 23, 2014, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order Re Cross Motions
for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motions to Strike and entered Judgment against the
Defendants. R. Vol. II, pp.293-308.
The Association filed a.r1 Application a..11.d Memora..11.du.in of Costs and Attorney's Fees. R.
Vol. II, pp.309-330.
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On August 6, 2014, Farner and

timely filed

Motion to Reconsider, Alter or

Defendants timely filed an Objection to Plaintiff's Application for Attorney's Fees. R. Vol.
TI, pp.331-368.
The Defendants filed an

to the Amended Complaint, Affirmative Defenses,

Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint on September 2, 2014. R. Vol. TI, pp.369-379
On September 2, 2014, Defendants timely filed a Notice of Appeal from the Court's
original Memorandum Decision. R. Vol. II, pp.380-385.
On December 17, 2014, the trial court heard argument on Appellants' Motion to
Reconsider, Alter or Amend and Respondent's Motion for Attorney's Fees. Tr. 12/17/14.
On January 20, 2015, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order Re: (1)
Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Strike; (2) Denying in Part and Granting in Part Defendants'
Objection to Fees and Costs; (3) Denying Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, Alter or Amend, all
following hearings on said Motion held December 17, 2014. R. Vol. III, pp.512-525
On January 20, 2015, the Court entered an Amended Judgment. R. Vol. ill, pp.526-529
On January 27, 2015, the Defendants filed their Second Amended Notice of Appeal from
the Court's Second Memorandum Decision and Order entered one week prior. R. Vol. III, pp.530538. Transcript 12/17/14.
The Appellants' appeal is timely to this Court.

3

~u11te1ne1u of

factual history is

as

On July 26, 1994, the Declarant (developer), Properties ofMountains West, recorded the
Covenants for Phase I of the Pend Oreille and subsequently recorded Covenants for Phase II on
January 25, 1995. Essentially, these are two (2) separate and distinct subdivisions are generally
identified as Pend Oreille

Estates. Articles of Incorporation were filed February 15, 1995,

but exclude Phase II properties. Bylaws were apparently adopted by Declarant February 17, 1995.
Access to Phase II property crosses approximate one and a half (1.5) miles of mountainous private
road through Phase I. See: Google Aerial maps, Pp. 7-9 herein.
Phase I Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions recorded July 26, 1994, as Instnunent No.
449457 ("Phase I CC&Rs") differ significantly from Phase II CC&Rs. See Clerk's Exhibits,
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants/ Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs' Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit "B" [hereafter '"Affidavit of Counsel Cross MSJ"]. As a
result, Phase I CC&Rs do not encumber Phase II property.
Phase II is governed by Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions recorded January 25, 1995,
as Instrument No. 459407 ("Phase II CC&Rs"). See Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Counsel Cross
MSJ, Exhibit "D". Although Phase II CC&Rs designate

owners as members of the Association,

it expressly limits the Association's authority over Phase II.
Review of the Phase I and II CC&Rs reflects that while Phase I consists of twenty (20) acre
tracts and was intended (ai'1d is) a residential development, Phase II consists of sixt-y (60) acre tracts
and is (to date) all unimproved recreational land that can only be accessed through Phase I. Clerk's
Exhibits, Affidavit of Counsel Cross MSJ, Exhibit

4

[P.l and§ 1.04] and "D" [§3.04]

Famers took title on January 19, 1995

Instrument No. 459534. 1

took title

8,

Articles of Incorporation and Phase I's CC&Rs exclude any reference or description
Phase II properties. See Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Counsel Cross MSJ, pp.2-3.
The Phase II CC&Rs provide that owners within Phase II are required to "belong to and
maintain a membership
Cross MSJ, Ex.

the Phase I Owners' Association". Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Counsel

("Phase II CC&Rs, §2.01 "). The "Phase I Owner's Association", in tum, has

limited assessment power over Phase II Owners.
The limited Association powers are specified as follows:
2.03 Powers of the Association. The Association shall have the
power to do all the things enumerated in the CCRs for Phase I as
recorded as Instrument No. 449457, records of Bonner County,
Idaho. PROVIDED HOWEVER, that except to the extent the
Association has the right to enforce the payment of the lawful
assessments of the Association pertaining directly to the
maintenance of roads that the CCRs for Phase I, recorded as
Instrument No. 449457, records of Bonner County, Idaho require the
Association to maintain, including the right to any lien on any tract
for failure to pay any assessment(s) lawfully due the Association, the
powers of the Association shall not extend to the Phase Il property
herein described.

Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Counsel
Cross MSJ, Exhibit "D", § 2.03 [underline added]
The Phase Il CC&Rs also expressly empowers Owners to '"improve" those roads adjacent to

their properties, while acknowledging the Association's limited right to "maintain" roads. Phase Il
CC&Rs §2.04.

1

Famer's deed is actually dated six (6) days prior Phase II CC&Rs recordation, calling into
5

Finally,

Bylaws of the Association include the Phase Il properties as members of the

Idaho.
5, ("Bylaws") §1.09. The Bylaws

Association's

ability to increase regular annual assessments (no more than 20% per year) and limit special
assessments to no more than one hundred percent (100%) of the previous year's regular, annual
assessment. Bylaws §§ 4.01 and 4.02.
The Bylaws provide for by-law amendment only by majority vote of the membership.
Bylaws§ 10 However, Phase II CC&Rs only permit amendment of the CC&Rs by a "vote of
seventy-five percent (75%) of the Tract Owners" of Phase II and in such event "each Phase II owner
shall be entitled to cast as many votes as there are acres in said ownership's tract." Phase II CC&Rs
§5.02
The Association's "special assessment" for paving was not lawful as it exceeded the
assessment powers of the Bylaws and Phase II CC&Rs. The Association's actions exceeded the
authority granted in the recorded Phase II CC&Rs for "maintenance" of roads the Association is
required to maintain under the Phase I CC&Rs. The paving of the Phase I roads constitutes
improvement exceeding the Phase I Association's authority to assess for maintenance of the road.
The District Court's decisions must be reversed and remanded with instructions to enter
summary judgment for Appellants as to the paving assessment on their counterclaims of Slander of
Title, Quiet Title, Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief and awarding Appellants attorney's
fees and costs. R. Vol. II, Pp. 369-379.

Appellants are also entitled to further proceedings on their

claims of quiet title, declaratorJ judgment and injlh~ctive relief as to tlie legality of the Phase I
Association's regular annual assessments.

question their effect over Farner's Property.

6
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PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Were
authority?

"legal"

Whether the paving is an improvement or maintenance as a matter of law.
C.

The Phase Il CC&Rs do not empower the Phase I Association to assess, lien or enforce
payment against the Appellants for "improvements.
The Phase I Association has no power to expand its authority beyond that contained
in the recorded instruments affecting Phase Il.
the Association's actions in adopting a special assessment lawful under the
Bylaws and other corporate documents.

F.

The Appellants are entitled, on remand, to further proceedings and grant of
Judgment on their Quiet title, Declaratory Judgment and Injunction claims regarding
the Association's past and future regular assessments

G.

The District Court erred in awarding the Association attorney's fees and costs.

H.

The Defendants are entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal.

10

grant

court

motion

same

standard as used by the district judge originally ruling on the motion. Summary judgment is proper
if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file together with

affidavits, if any, show that

is no genuine as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter oflaw." Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho

359, 93 PJd 685,690

(2004).
"The fact that the parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment does not change
the applicable standard of review, and this court must evaluate each party's motions on its own
merits." Id, citing Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 998 P.2d 1118 (1999).
"When interpreting CC&Rs, this Court generally applies the rules of contract construction."
Sky Canyon Properties, LLC v. Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC, 315 P.3d 792, 794, 155 Idaho 604,
606 (2013)
"To determine whether ambiguity exists, "the court must view the agreement as a whole to
determine the intent of the parties at the time of contracting. If a covenant is unambiguous, the court
must apply its plain meaning as a matter of!aw." Adams v. Kimberley One Townhouse Owner's
Ass'n, Inc., 352 P.3d 492,495 (2015) [emphasis added]
"If a contract's terms are clear and unambiguous, the contract's meaning and legal effect are

questions of law to be determined from the plain meaning of its own words." Sky Canyon
Properties, LLC v. Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC, 315 P.3d 792, 794, 155 Idaho 604,606
(Idaho,2013); quoting: Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 367, 79

11

723, 726 (2003).

"Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question

law over which we exercise
792,

Idaho 1

106

review."

155

604,

468 (2005).

For the reasons set forth herein, the District Court's decision is erroneous as a matter oflaw
and must be reversed and remanded with instructions to grant Appellants' motion for summary
judgment and to award attorney's

and costs to the Defendants at the trial court level. Further,

Appellant is entitled to costs and attorney's fees on this appeal.
Were the Association's assessments against Appellants' property "legal" and

within its authority.
A corporation has "no powers except as are expressly or impliedly conferred by its charter.
Sanderson v. Salmon River Canal Co., 45 Idaho 244,263 P. 32, 34 (1927). "[A] corporation's
power to act must be construed by reference to the purposes expressed or implied in its articles of
incorporation." Sinclair & Co., Inc. v. Gurule, 757 P.2d 225, 229, 114 Idaho 362,366 (App.,1988)
Here, the Phase I Association's Articles of Incorporation only refer to Phase I properties, not
Phase II. The Bylaws reference both Phase I and II. Neither the Articles nor Bylaws expressly
authorize the Association to make "improvements" to the roads in Phase I. Further, the Phase I
CC&Rs do not authorize such improvements,
Finally, the Phase II CC&Rs (the only recorded instrument affecting Phase II) limit the
Association's powers to assess, lien or enforce payment against Phase II Owners to only legal
actions "directly pert.aining to the mai.11tenance of roads that the CCR' s for Phase I. .. require the
Association to maintain". Phase II CC&Rs §2.03.
Sections 2.03 and 2.04 of the Phase II CC&Rs must be read together as they clearly define
and limit the Association's

identifying

improvements:

l2

O\vner's reserved po-wers over road

Association shall have the
power to do all the things enumerated
the CCRs for Phase as
of
County,
that except to
extent the
lawful
Association has the right to enforce the payment of
assessments of the Association pertaining directly to the
maintenance of roads that the CCRs for Phase I, recorded as
Instrument No. 449457, records Bonner County, Idaho require the
Association to maintain, including
right to any lien on any tract
for failure to pay any assessment(s) lawfully due the Association, the
powers of the Association shall not extend to the Phase II property
herein described.
1"Af'•Arr1c

2.04 Limitation on Powers.
Association shall not have the
power to maintain roads over and across the property described in
Paragraphs 1 and 2 above, or the property adjacent to or near to the
property as more particularly described in the Bylaws of the Owners'
Association, the owner of which choose and are qualified as
members of the Association, it being the intent of the Declarant that
the portion of the access road over and across the property described
in said paragraphs be maintained solely at the expense of the owner
thereof and that the roads maintain their existing character as a
sportsman's access or recreational road. This limitation shall not
affect the authority and obligation of the Association to maintain said
access road on property outside the boundaries of the property
described and over which roads access to the and from the county
road is necessary. Neither shall this limitation impair the ability of
individual owners of the lots herein described to improve that portion
of the road across the property owned by them. [See § 3.04] The
Association shall not have the power to levy any assessments against
owners in Phase II except such assessments as pertain directly to the
maintenance of roads as referred to in the CCRs recorded as
Instrument No. 449457, records of Bonner County, Idaho require
said Association to maintain.
Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Counsel,
Cross MSJ, Exhibit "D" [emphasis added]
The Phase I Association's authority is limited to maintenance and is distinguished from
improvement. Further, the Phase I Association is liiu.ited to only that assessment power for
maintenance as specified in the Phase II CC&Rs.

(d)
Association has the right
power to contract for the
purchase of tools, equipment, materials, supplies and other personal
property
services
the maintenance and repair of the private
road(s) and/or to contract for and pay
reconstruction of any
of the private road(s) damaged or destroyed.
portion or
Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Counsel
Cross MSJ, Exhibit "B", Phase I CC&Rs §2.04 (d)
contract's terms are

and unambiguous, the contract's meaning and legal effect are

questions of law to be determined from the plain meaning of its own words." Sky Canyon
Properties, LLC v. Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC, 315 P.3d 792, 794, 155 Idaho 604,606 (2013);
quoting: Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364,367, 79 P.3d 723, 726 (2003).
The Phase I Association's corporate Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation and the Phase I and II
CC&Rs expressly limit the corporation's powers to maintenance of roads. The Trial Court's failed
to analyze or discuss whether the paving assessment exceeds the limited authority of the
Association.

a matter of law, the paving constituted an improvement, rather than maintenance

roads, exceeding the Phase I Association's authority. This Court should reverse the Trial
Court's ruling and remand with instructions to grant Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment as
to the paving assessment sought by Phase I Owner's Association. The Trial Court on remand must
also grant Appellants' summary judgment on

Quiet Title and Declaratory Judgment claims

regarding the extent of the Association's authority to make regular assessments for maintenance of
the roads that exceed the Bylaw limitations.

C.

\Vnether the paving is an improvement or maintenance as a matter of law.

There are numerous sources that identify road paving as improvements. The Idaho Sales
and Use Tax regulations describe paving as an act of improving real property. I.D.A.P.A.
35.01.02.013.02 (2015). Likewise, the Board

Appeals recognizes

paving of bare land

as an improvement subject to separate valuation. In the Matter of the Appeals of Dave Smith

Chevrolet, Inc., 2008 WL 2736085 (Bd. Tax Appeals, 2008). Likewise, Black's Law Dictionary
as that

value or

lS

or

appearance or value, while maintenance is defined as general "repair or upkeep".
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) The Phase I and II CC&Rs both adopt language that
acknowledges this distinction and indicate a consistent use of the term "maintenance" when
referring to the Association powers, while referring to "improvements" when discussing Owner's
powers.
More to the point,just weeks prior to the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, Alter or Amend, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its
decision in Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc. v. Summerwind Partners, LLC, 157 Idaho 600,338 P.3d 1204
(2004), which was argued by Appellants' at the hearing. Tr. 12/17/2014, Pp. 11-16.
In Hap Taylor & Sons, the Court held that "roadways" are correctly defined as "structures
and therefore "improvements" to land. The Court noted as follows:
Labeling paved roadways and cart paths as structures comports with
the dictionary definition of "structure." Indeed, Webster's Third New
International Dictionary of the English Language 2267 (Philip
Babcock Gove et al. eds., G. & C. Merriam Co. 1971), defines
structure as "something [that is] constructed or built" and provides
the following example: "demolish any building, highway, road,
railroad, excavation, or other structure." Because roadways and cart
paths are analogous to railroads and wagon roads, and because
calling roadways and cart paths structures is consistent with the
dictionary definition of "structure," we hold roadways and cart paths
are structures under Idaho Code section 45-501. Consequently,
roadways and cart paths are "improvements" for purposes of
applying Idaho Code section 45-508.
Hap Taylor & Sons, foe. v. SwTuTierwind Pai-tners, LLC,
338 P.3d 1204, 1218, 157 Idaho 600,614 (2014)
More specifically, the Court noted
improving the land. "Similarly, roadways and cart paths are built on the land and entail preparing

15

placing

placing and compacting

8, 1

Idaho

600,614 (2014)
As a matter of law,

act of paving the Phase I roadways is one of creating a structure and,

therefore, an improvement on the property. The Phase I Association's corporate charter, including
the applicable Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation, coupled with the Phase I and Phase II CC&Rs,
make clear the Phase I Association is not empowered to "improve" the roadways or to assess, lien
or enforce liens for such improvements. The District Court's Decision was in error and must be
reversed and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the Appellants on
their counterclaims and to dismiss the Respondent's complaint.

D.

The Phase II CC&Rs do not empower the Phase I Association to assess, lien
o:r enforce payment against the Appellants for "improvements".

"Idaho recognizes the validity of covenants that restrict the use of private property." Pinehaven
Planning Board v. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 829, 70 P.3d 664, 667 (2003).
"However, because restrictive covenants are in derogation of the common law right to use land for
all lawful purposes, the court will not extend by implication any restriction not clearly expressed."
Pinehaven Planning Board, supra. For this reason, the presumption when interpreting the CC&Rs favors
the Appellants.
"When interpreting CC&Rs, this Court generally applies the rules of contract construction."
Sky Canyon Properties, LLC v. Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC, 315 P.3d 792, 794, 155 Idaho 604,606

(2013)

""If a contract's terms are clear and unambiguous, the contract's meaning and legal effect are
questions of law to be determined from the plain meaning of its O'Wn words." Sky Canyon Properties, LLC

16

II
discussing Phase I Association authority versus Owner's rights. Phase II CC&Rs §2.03. The Phase I
Association is limited to assessments "pertaining directly to the maintenance of roads". As discussed
above, the Phase I Association is only lawfully empowered under Phase I CC&Rs to conduct maintenance.
See: Phase I CC&Rs, §2.04(d).
More importantly, the Association's powers with regard to assessments on Phase II owners
is specifically limited to assessments for maintenance of roads. This term "maintenance" or
"maintain" is used twice in§ 2.03 of the Phase II CC&Rs again in§ 2.04 and consistently
throughout both Phase I and Phase II' s CC&Rs when discussing Association powers. By contrast,
§2.04 acknowledges the Owners right to "improve" the roads adjacent to their parcels. Phase II
CC&Rs §2.04
"Words or phrases that have established definitions in common use, or settled legal
meanings, are not rendered ambiguous merely because they are not defined in the document where
they are used." Pinehaven Planning Board v. Brooks, 138 Idaho at 829.
The Supreme Court has held: "If an ambiguity is found in the restrictive covenant, the Court
is to determine the intent of the parties at the time the instrument was drafted." Brown v. Perkins,
923 P.2d 434,438, 129 Idaho 189, 193 (1996).

Although no explicit "defmition of these two

terms appears in the operative documents, the Declarant's use of the terms in context makes clear
the intent.
However, if the Court determines the lack of express definitions for the terms
"maintenance" or "improvement" may render them ambiguous, the Court is required to determine
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of the drafter or parties which can be "ascertained from the language of the covenants,

189, 193 (1996)

434,438,

In determining whether a covenant is patently ambiguous, the "court looks at the face of the
document and gives the words or phrases used their established definitions in common use or
settled legal meanings." Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., Inc., 175 P.3d 748, 751, 145 Idaho 59, 62
(2007).
Words or phrases "are construed according to the context and the approved usage of the
language, but technical words and phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and
appropriate meaning in law, or are defmed in the succeeding section, are to be construed according
to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or defmition." Idaho Code§ 73-113(3) (2015).
Whether applying the legal definitions of these words or the common usage, it is clear from
the context that the developer and drafter of the CC&Rs deemed "maintenance" and
"improvement" to be distinctly different acts and the Phase I Association is limited to only
maintenance assessments on Phase II owners. The plain meaning, legal meaning and context of the
developer's use of"maintenance" makes clear that improving the road by the act of building up and
paving is beyond the Association's authority.
The Court erred in finding that the Covenants of record authorized the Association to
assess, lien or enforce payment against Appellants for the paving improvements. This Court is
asked to reverse and remand with instruction to the Trial Court to enter summary judgment for
Appellants.
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E.

The Phase I Association has no power to expand its authority
recorded
affecting Phase

n ..,J.n. 111,n

to assess
lien property.

empowerment must be reflected

covenants, bylaws or other recorded

instruments. 2
"When interpreting such covenants, the court generally applies the rules of contract
construction. However, because restrictive covenants are in derogation of the common law right to
use land for all lawful purposes, the court will not extend by implication any restriction not clearly
expressed." Pinehaven Planning Board, supra.
This Court in Pinehaven Planning Board also noted that even where ambiguities exist that
might be subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the Courts must apply the presumption
in favor of

use of the land, as a matter oflaw. Pinehaven Planning Board, 138 Idaho at 830.

This is significant in light of the developer's use of the terms "maintenance" versus
"improvements" when discussing individual lot owners' rights. This significance comes well into
focus when considering the Association's unilateral decision to incur over $200,000.00 in paving
expense through portions of the common road in Phase I and thereafter to impose a disproportionate (41 %) share of this unlawful assessment against the Phase II recreational Tracts and their
Owners. The Appellants were not permitted to vote on either the approval of the "one-time special
assessment" or the manner of proportionate distribution of the assessment.
For argument's sake, if the Phase I CC&Rs or other corporate documents empowered the

Association in any way beyond maintenance, that empowerment would be expressly limited by the
Phase II CC&Rs, as the only recorded instrument having any arguable encumbrance on Appellants'

2

The Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws were never recorded.
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properties.

Idaho Code § 45-810, the power to assess the Defendants is limited to only those
or

owners

Association to only allow assessment against Phase II lot
owners for "lawful assessments of the Association pertaining directly to the maintenance of roads".
It does not permit or allow for the Association to run roughshod over Phase II owners,
disenfranchise Appellants

the voting process and disproportionately allocate the paving

assessment (41 %) to Appellants.
For these reasons, this Court is asked to reverse the trial court's Memorandum Decision and
remand with instructions to enter Summary Judgment in favor of Appellants and award the
Defendants' fees and costs, both at trial level and on appeal.

F.

Are the Association's actions in adopting a special assessment lawful under the
Bylaws and other corporate documents?

The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision and Order states that the Court "finds the
'Amendment to Bylaws of Pend Oreille View Estates Owners Association, Inc., 4.02.01 One Time

Road Paving Assessment', recorded in the Bonner County Records on August 16, 2012, to be an
exception to the provision in paragraph 4.02 that no special assessment should be one hundred
(100) percent of an annual assessment, and that the Association was authorized to make such an
exception under its special assessment powers." R. Vol. ill, P. 522.
The Court never explains from where the Association derives its authority to rnake this
special assessment in excess of the limits in §4.02. If the Trial Colli-t asswued that the powers to
amend the Bylaws, as provided therein, also empowered this One Time Road Paving Assessment,
the Court failed to explain how the authority in an unrecorded Bylaw could override the Phase II
CC&Rs a.11d their limits on the Phase I Association.

20

the Phase I CC&Rs, Section 2.04, only empowers the Association to contract for

private road(s) damaged or destroyed." Phase I CCRs, § 2.04(d). There is no evidence that the act
of paving was done as reconstruction after damage or destruction of the roads.
Additionally, the Bylaws of the Pend Oreille View Estates Owners' Association, Inc.
prohibited the special assessment at issue in this litigation.
The Bylaws provide for initial regular assessments at an annual rate of $50.00 per tract. 3
The Bylaws further provide that the regular assessment cannot be increased more than twenty
percent (20%) per year. The Plaintiff themselves classify this as a "special assessment". See
Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Teresa Zirwes, Exhibit 5, §4.01.
Special assessments are defined in the Bylaws as follows:
4.02 Special Assessments. Any special assessment must be
recommended by the board and be approved by a vote of a majority
of the voting power of each member. In any year, a special
assessment may not exceed 100% of an annual assessment.
Bylaws,§ 4.02
Although the record is less than clear as to what the annual assessment was at the time of
the "special assessment for paving", it appears that the prior year's assessment was apparently
several thousand dollars as the Appellants Farner were informed they could not vote at the "special
assessment" meeting \vithout paying $5,940, or $2,970.00 per parcel for prior years' regular ar.nual
assessment. R. Vol. I, P. 154; Clerk's Exhibits, Amended Complaint. Even the Supplemental
Affidavit of Greg Zirwes filed in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment,
acknowledges that the dues have been at $690.00 per year for tlie past seven years. R. Vol. II,
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and

indicates the Phase I

1996 to

2

excess

began at $50.00,
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could only pennissibly increase twenty percent (20%) each year. Under this calculation, the
assessment in 1997 could only have increased by twenty percent (20%) to $60.00, to $72.00 in
1998, $86.40 in 1999 and to $103.68 in 2000, etc. Applying the maximum increase to each
successive year until 2011 would set the annual assessment in 20 I l at no more than $772.13 per
tract. Thus, Mr. Zirwes admission that the regular assessment had been at $690.00 for seven (7)
years prior to the Pavii1g assessment gives some indication of how the Phase I Association has
deviated from its own Bylaws.

In this instance, the Defendant, T.T., LLC, was assessed $41,540.34 for its parcel. The
Defendants Farner were assessed $23,740.17 for each of their two (2) parcels in Phase Il. For T.T.,
LLC, this "one-time special assessment" for paving by the Association represents 53.8 times the
legally permissible special assessment of$772.13. 4 For Farner, the "one-time special assessment"
is 30.75 times the lawful special assessment limit of $772.13.
The District Court makes no explanation for how the "one-time assessment" is an exception
permitted by §4.02. Presumably, the Court deems this an amendment to the bylaw as provided in
Section l O of the Bylaws. However, the Bylaws are not recorded instruments. They do not
empower the Association to assess, lien or enforce payment against Phase II properties under Idaho
Code§ 45-810. The Phase II CC&Rs §§2.03 and 2.04 are the only recorded instruments that

3

Defendants Farner own two (2) tracts. Defendant T.T., LLC owns two (2) tracts.
Plaintiff's Complaint does not appear to recognize
has two (2) parcels, but the result is
still an unlawfully excessive assessment under the Bylaws.
4

22

the Association

§

0 to assess,

or

II

against

owners.
the power to assess,

or

payment pertaining "directly to the maintenance of roads" that the Phase I Association is required to
maintain under the Phase I CC&Rs. In all other regards, the Association's powers "shall not extend
to the Phase II property". This necessarily includes amendments of the Bylaws that circumvent the
Phase II CC&R limitations on Association powers.
The Association sued under Idaho Code§ 45-810.
(1) Whenever a homeowner's association levies an assessment
against a lot for the reasonable costs incurred in the maintenance of
common areas consisting of real property owned and maintained by
the association, the association, upon complying with subsection (2)
of this section, shall have a lien upon the individual lot for such
unpaid assessments accrued in the previous twelve (12) months.
Idaho Code § 45-810 (2015)
Subsection (2) of the Code section requires, among other things, that the homeowner
association record a lien and send a copy to the lot owner. Notably, Section six (6) defines a
homeowner association with such authority as:
"Homeowner's association" means any incorporated or
unincorporated association: (a) In which membership is based upon
owning or possessing an interest in real property; and (b) That has
the authority, pursuant to recorded covenants, bylaws or other
governing instruments, to assess and record liens against the real
property of its members.
Idaho Code§ 45-810(6) (2015)
[emphasis added]
The only recorded instrument giving authority to assess or record liens against Phase II
properties is the Phase II CC&Rs. The Pend Oreille View Estates 0\vner' s Association Bylaws are
not recorded.
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The

erred in finding that the Association was authorized to make the special

assessment

Association,
is asked to reverse the

Decision

and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment for Appellants on their counterclaims and
to award attorney's fees and costs at trial level and on appeal.

The Appellants are entitled, on remand, to further proceedings and grant of
Judgment on their Quiet title, Declaratory Judgment and Injunction claims
regarding the Association's past and future regular assessments.
As discussed above, the record establishes that the Phase I Association for the past several
years has failed to abide by the limitations on annual regular assessments and, in the case of the
paving, special assessments. The Appellant's Counterclaims seek Quiet Title, Declaratory
Judgment and Injunctive relief from the Trial Court directing the Association to abide by these
limitations, to be accountable for past over assessments and to prohibit the Association by
injunction from future assessments that violate the Bylaws.
The Amended Complaint in this case alleges that the Association is also seeking to recover
for regular assessments from 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 as against Farner. Clerk's Exhibits,
Amended Complaint, Exhibit 11. Idaho Code§ 45-810(3)(2015) provides that an association lien
will only continue in effect for a period of one (1) year from the date the claim is filed and recorded
and that period may be extended by not to exceed one (1) additional year by recording additional
extension. In addition to recorded liens expiring after one (1) year, the Association is limited to
asserting a lien for only unpaid assessments "accrued in the previous twelve (12) months". I.C. §
45-810(1).

In addition to the issue of association assessments in excess of the legally permissible
amount, the record makes clear that with regard to Farner, the Association is seeking judgment for
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liens

§ 45-810(3). These issues (the unlawful

assessment amounts and attempt to-~._,,.,.,,
Quiet Title, L''-'•-u.u,u.Lv~
is no dispute of fact on these matters and this Court must reverse the Trial Court and
remand with instructions to grant Appellants' Motions for Summary Judgment on these claims.
The District Court erred in awarding the Association attorney's fees and costs.

It was error for the District Court to find for the Association and this Court is asked to
reverse and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment for Appellants on their
counterclaims and to award attorney's fees and costs at trial level and on appeal.
"However, where there is a valid contract between the parties which contains a provision
for an award of attorney fees and costs, the terms of that contractual provision establish a right to an
award of attorney fees and costs."Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Wissel, 836 P.2d 511, 514-15,
122 Idaho 565, 568-69 (1992). "In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees ...
to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)( 1)(B), when provided for by any statute or
contract." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). The applicable declaration provision in this case provides that: "In the
event suit is brought to enforce the covenants contained herein, the prevailing party shall be entitled
to be awarded his reasonable attorney's fees in addition to allowed costs." Adams v. Kimberley
One Townhouse Owner's Ass'n, Inc., 352 P.3d 492,499 (2015).
Additionally, Idaho Code§ 12-121 permits the award of fees and costs to a prevailing party
on appeal where the action is brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.
Idaho Code§ 12-121 (2015).
As discussed above, the operative, recorded instrument is the Phase II CC&Rs. Section
5.03 provides that the declarant (Yellowstone Basin Properties dfb/a Properties of Mountains West)
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a tract owner"
1S

bring action to enforce the Phase II CC&Rs. Further, it provides that "if the
or

part,

or tract owner

to recover necessary court costs for the action, including reasonable attorney's fees." Phase
II CC&Rs, §5.03. Further, attorney's fees and costs are provided for in the Bylaws,§ 4.04.
Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Theresa Zirwes, Exhibit 5, § 4.04.
For the reasons discussed above, Appellants ask the Court to reverse the Trial Court and
remand with instructions to enter summary judgment for Appellants. In such event, the Appellants,
as Tract Owners

Phase II are entitled to attorney's fees and costs to be awarded at the trial court

level.

I.

The Defendants are entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal.

"Idaho Appellate Rule (I.AR.) 41 provides the procedure for requesting attorney fees on
appeal. I.AR. 41 allows this Court to award attorney fees only if permitted by some other statutory
or contractual authority; it is not authority alone for awarding fees." Shawver v. Huckleberry
Estates. L.L.C., 93 P.3d 685,696, 140 Idaho 354, 365 (2004)
"Attorney fees may be awarded if authorized by statute or contract." Sherman Storage, LLC
v. Global Signal Acquisitions II, LLC, 2015 WL 6657666 (2015); quoting: Stibal v. Fano, 157

Idaho 428,435,337 P.3d 587,594 (2014). Additionally, Idaho Code§ 12-121 permits the award
of fees and costs to a prevailing party on appeal where the action is brought or pursued frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation. Idaho Code § 12-121 (2015).
The Phase II CC&Rs provide in pertinent part, as follows:

5.03 Enforcement. The provisions of this Declaration, or any
lawful amendments, may be enforced by the Declarant or a Tract
Owner .... In any action for the enforcement of the CCR's, if the
relief prayed for is granted in whole or in part, the Declarant or
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Owner prevailing shall be entitled to recover necessary court costs
for the action, including reasonable attorney's fees.

Exhibits, Affidavit of
Counsel, Phase TI CC&Rs
The Trial Court's Summary Judgment must be reversed and remanded with instructions to
grant the Defendants' summary judgment and with instructions to award attorney's fees and costs to
Appellants against the Respondent at the Trial Court level and on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
reasons set
to reverse the Trial

as set
findings set forth

is ""'"'""""'1' h
the Memorandum Decision and to

remand this matter with instructions to the Trial Court to enter Judgment in favor of Appellants

and awarding attorney's fees and costs.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ...,__.~

of December, 2015 .

Attorney for Appellants
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I hereby
that on the
of December, 2015, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner:
Peter Erbland, Esq.
LAKE CITY LAW GROUP
P.0.BoxE
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 816

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand delivered
Facsimile No. (208) 664-6338
Other:

I
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